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Abstract | Swiss metropolitan areas and their municipalities face challenges as e.g. the increasing number 
and the bigger mobility of their inhabitants, economic structural changes or the on-going urban sprawl in 
suburban regions. Whereas the core cities of such areas have been studied intensively, there exist little 
theoretical and empirical knowledge about the political decision-making and implementation processes in 
smaller suburban municipalities concerning the important relations between the public and the private 
for planning and generating the built environment. 
I thus investigate the following research questions: What different kinds of governance 
arrangements exist in suburban municipalities and which factors let these types emerge? How then can 
public and private stakeholders influence the decision making and implementation processes of local 
development policies within these arrangements? Theoretically I draw on literature about local 
governance-types, recent work on small democracies and on urban regime theory. The case selection 
bases on two criteria theoretically relevant for the emergence of different governance arrangements: The 
size and the economic situation of a municipality. 
The results of the qualitative analysis show that different governance arrangements exist in the 
four suburban municipalities related to the collaboration between relevant actors, the decision and 
implementation rationales and the political resources used. Bigger municipalities tend to be governed by 
urban regime-like forms of cooperation between public and private actors. Governance arrangements in 
smaller municipalities are however characterised by looser forms of cooperation. Where public actors are 
able to dominate the local governance arrangements in economically positive surroundings, they are more 
dependent on private actors in shrinking municipalities, but only when it comes to pivotal building 
projects because the mayors interpret the role of the state more in an active, than only in an intervening 
way. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Switzerland is the longer the more a country of functionally integrated agglomerations 
and metropolitan areas. Swiss metropolitan areas and their municipalities face 
challenges as e.g. the increasing number and the bigger mobility of their inhabitants in 
terms of commuting and housing, economic structural changes or the on-going urban 
sprawl in suburban municipalities. All these factors impose a heavy burden on the 
politicians, the bureaucrats, the planners and the architects working in the field of local 
spatial planning and development. This situation is especially challenging for smaller 
municipalities, because their administrative capacities and the local political systems are 
supposed to be weaker, hence the capacity to handle topics as housing, spatial planning, 
urban design and local economic development smaller than the ones of the core cities.  
The political processes of urban development and spatial planning in core cities 
of such (Swiss) metropolitan areas have been studied intensively2. The same is true for 
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the different politico-institutional solutions concerning the governance of functionally 
integrated urban areas3. There exist however little theoretical and empirical knowledge 
about the political decision-making and implementation processes in smaller suburban 
municipalities concerning the important relations between the public and the private for 
planning and generating the built environment. 
I thus investigate the following research questions: What different kinds of 
governance arrangements exist in suburban municipalities and which factors let these 
types emerge? How then can public and private stakeholders influence the decision-
making and implementation processes of local development policies within these 
arrangements? 
This focus should make it possible to tie this paper up at Dahl’s legendary 
question of ‘who governs?’, linking it to smaller municipalities (of metropolitan areas). It 
is in my view very relevant too to know how such municipalities are governed and by 
whom. Different governance arrangements feature – as we will see later – significantly 
differing power structures and forms of cooperation between locally important public 
and private actors. These differences result generally in a variance of local strategies for 
spatial planning, housing and development and more concretely in different outcomes 
concerning the public space, the type of housing and local business provided; in short: 
the built environment in which the longer the more a majority of Swiss inhabitants is 
living in.  
This article starts with a theoretical overview on the state of the art of the urban 
governance literature and with a newly derived theoretical model concerning the 
emergence of different local governance arrangements. This theoretical chapter is 
followed by a short methodological overview. Chapter four then reflects the results of 
four case studies, showing the different local governance arrangements and the 
possibilities of different stakeholders to influence the decisions for spatial planning and 
local development policies. It however also uncovers the shortcoming of the proposed 
model. The results are then discussed in chapter five followed by concluding remarks 
and some thoughts about possible further research. 
2 LOCAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS 
AND HYPOTHESES 
Dahl’s question of ‘who governs?’ has in urban contexts and when focusing on urban 
development and spatial planning been investigated mostly with the help of different 
strands of urban governance thinking. Until now mostly big cities as Atlanta, New Haven, 
New York, Birmingham, Zurich or London have been under scrutiny though. This 
chapter focuses thus on the state of the art of the urban governance literature and sorts 
out its most important propositions with the aim at adapting them to a theoretical 
model with which also smaller (suburban) municipalities can be studied 
comprehensively. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See for example Hunter (1953), Dahl (1961), Stone (1989), Knox/Taylor (1993), Cattacin (1994), Hitz et 
al. (1995), Rüegg (1996), Kleger (1996), Kühne (1997), Sassen (2001), Eberle (2003), Schmid (2006), van 
der Heiden (2010) or Devecchi (2012). 
3 The metropolitan governance-debate: See for example Lefèvre (1998), Norris (2001), Kübler (2003), 
Brenner (2004), Savitch/Vogel (2009), Kübler/Schwab (2007), Plüss/Kübler (2010) or Koch (2011) 
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2.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN GOVERNANCE AND ITS USE FOR 
SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITIES 
Power and decision making processes have been an important research agenda for 
urban scholars during the last half century. The long discussion was launched by the 
community power debate, in which elitist and pluralist explanations for the distribution 
of power were widely deliberated (see Hunter 1953; Mills 1956 [2000]; Dahl 1961). 
After a decade in which structural approaches with a focus on external (capitalist) 
factors on city’s power structure began to be more present (Castells 1972; Lefebvre 
1974 [1991]), the first urban governance concepts arose during the 1980ies (Fainstein 
and Fainstain 1983; Logan and Molotch 1987; Elkin 1987; Stone 1989). These works 
approached Dahl’s question of ‘who governs?’ again from a local perspective, 
(re)emphasising local actors and their ‘capacity to govern’ a city. The work on urban 
regimes began to be the focal point of American urban scholars. This concept, where 
urban regimes are defined as longstanding formal or informal coalition between political 
and private actors, sharing a common policy agenda and thus bridging the necessary 
resources for a city’s (economic) development (Stone 1993; Mossberger and Stoker 
2001), has been used widely and has brought many insights in regard to the 
collaboration between public and private interests and their jointly pursued policy goals 
(see e.g. Orr and Stoker 1994; Ferman 1996; Kühne 1997; John and Cole 1998; Dowding 
et al. 1999; Hamilton 2002; Devecchi 2012). Urban regime scholars however have also 
been criticised, mostly by authors writing on (comparative) urban governance (Kantor 
et al. 1997; Imbroscio 1998, 2003; Davies 2002, 2003). The central critique concerns the 
ethnocentrique focus on mainly American cities and the fact that typically single case 
studies have been conducted. Both factors limit the development of new theoretical 
propositions, valid for more than only American cities (Pierre 2005). It is hence widely 
suggested to implement urban regime theory in a broader governance framework what 
is elaborated later on in this chapter.  
When talking about urban governance, it is clearly important to define the way in 
which I will use the term governance throughout my argumentation. Many different 
meanings have been used for this term until today, whereby commonly three different 
definitions are mentioned (Pierre 2005; Koch 2011). Firstly governance can be 
understood as a theory, which offers an analytical framework with a set of criteria that 
define the relevant objects to study and their relations. As an observer one has to focus 
on the processes occurring between the different actors, be they public or private, when 
pursuing collectively defined objectives. Governance as a theory hence allows to look 
beyond institutional variables and thus brings the interaction – formal or informal – 
between different actors to the forefront (Stoker 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000). 
Secondly governance can be observed as a normatively driven organisational model 
based on private organisations competitively providing local services instead of local 
government institutions (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001). Finally one can focus on 
governance understanding it as an empirical objective of study, whose emergence and 
forms can be analysed either with governance as a theory or by other theoretical 
concepts, as e.g. with a neo-institutional model (Pierre 2005). Here the emphasis lies on 
the analysis of different political, social or economic forces which are responsible for the 
production and the sustainability of different modes or arrangements of governance, 
whereby governance is understood as “the pursuit of collective goals through an 
inclusive strategy of resource mobilization” (Pierre 2005: 449). Governance in that 
sense are all forms of exchange between political (the government) and private actors to 
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pursue collective goals. According to Pierre (1998) it would be misleading to see the 
new paradigm for the implementation of market instead of public organisations for 
providing public services as the starting point of governance. Governance is thus as old 
as government itself, because “all forms of government are embedded in – and shaped 
by – a particular model of state-society interaction” (Pierre 1998: 4).  
It seems quite obvious that this last definition provides the best solution for the 
purpose of this article, in which a comparative analysis of different forms of governance 
arrangements is pursued. Not all forms of exchange between public and private actors 
should however be defined as governance, because “then soon everything becomes 
governance” (Pierre 1999: 376). To overcome such an oversimplification, Pierre (1998, 
1999, 2005) and others (see e.g. Kantor et al. 1997; Sellers 2002a; DiGaetano and Strom 
2003) suggest to introduce and then to analyse specific variables, which help to focus on 
relevant processes and factors that are assumed for being responsible for the emergence 
of different (local) governance arrangements.  
This conceptualisation has led to a line-up of various theoretical, ideal-typical 
models, types or arrangements of local and urban governance. Stone (2005), Stoker and 
Mossberger (1994) and others write on the already mentioned urban regimes, coming 
up with different regime types, mostly distinguishable by their policy agenda4. They 
mention the relation between public and private actors as the most important variable 
for the establishment of a longstanding cooperation. Kantor et al. (1997) define eight 
regime types5 according to different bargaining situations between public and private 
actors, which are structured by intergovernmental relations to higher state levels, the 
market position of a city and the possibilities for democratic participation of the 
inhabitants. Pierre (1999) defines four models of urban governance6, which are shaped 
mainly by local factors, as “the composition of key participants, the overarching 
objectives that characterize the governance, the main instruments employed to attain 
these objectives, and the most common outcomes of the different models” (Pierre 1999: 
377). DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) focus on the relations between the state and the 
society, at the local governing logic and the key decision makers. These factors then 
bring up four different urban governing structures which can be observed by their 
policy agenda7. According to Sellers (2002a, 2002b, 2005) there are mainly three impact 
factors forming different governance settings – or regimes8 – in urban areas which are 
the trans-local markets and their actors, the political influences from higher institutional 
tiers (as federalist vs. centralist state organisation or different tax laws) and internal 
components of the urban political economy (as e.g. the social structures of the local 
actors, the natural vs. the built environment, the existing (public) infrastructure). 
DiGaetano and Strom (2003) finally try to integrate these different explanations for the 
rise of urban and local governance arrangements or regimes. They formulate a model of 
urban governance that consists of three different levels of governance, a structural one 
(urban/local political economy, different intergovernmental systems), a cultural one 
                                                        
4 As e.g. maintenance, development, middle-class progressive or lower-class opportunity expansion 
regimes (Stone 1993). 
5 Namely dirigist regimes (as planner or distributor regimes), dependent privat regimes (as vendor or 
radical), dependent public regimes (as grantsman or clientelist) and mercantile regimes (as commercial or 
free enterprise) (Kantor et al. 1997). 
6 Namely the managerial, the corporatist, the progrowth and the welfare state model of urban governance 
(Pierre 1999). 
7 Namely a clientelist, a corporatist, a managerial and a pluralist governing structure. 
8 Sellers (2002a: 370) names different regime types as e.g. comprehensive regimes, social-ecological 
regimes, upscaling regimes or local fordist regimes. His focus lies mainly on the governance of 
metropolitan areas, and not on their core cities alone.(2001 
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(based on values and norms of different political cultures) and an agency level (how and 
what local actors do according to the political culture and the structural factors). The 
authors derive different hypotheses for all these levels and possibilities of urban 
governance.  
This overview shows that there is mutual consent over the fact of different kinds 
of forces shaping the form, the type or the arrangement of governance in urban areas 
and core cities. The authors however do not agree when it comes to the exact functions 
of these variables, what could also be the result of different understandings of 
governance. In short, some authors define external influences (as e.g. institutional or 
economic factors), having an impact on the form of local governance whereby others 
define internal objects, actor relations or specific (institutional) processes to look at 
more closely – with the goal to distinguish different forms of governance from each 
other. Further they do not clearly agree on a common understanding regarding the most 
important external variables. Finally there is a clear focus either on the governance of 
metropolitan areas or on their core cities. Hence governance arrangements of smaller 
(suburban) municipalities are not at all key aspect of this theoretical and empirical body 
of literature.  
At this point this paper joins in. I want to make use of these two levels of 
important variables – internal and external – to investigate suburban municipalities and 
their local governance arrangements. On the one hand I will investigate on external 
factors influencing the shape of the governance arrangement. On the other hand I use 
the internal/local variables to grab and describe the different forms of local governance 
analytically. Local governance arrangements are defined according to my understanding 
of governance as the form of collaboration between local key actors (public and private) 
in the policy field of spatial planning and local development (what makes it possible to 
subsume all aforementioned types of governance, be they urban regimes, governance 
models, urban governance structures etc. as possible local governance arrangements). 
To identify the different forms of collaboration I focus – according to the general 
governance literature – on the most important policy instruments used and on the policy 
agenda formulated by local actors. The focus on policy instruments is useful, because 
every choice of a certain policy instruments can be seen as the result of a specific 
relationship between a government and the public (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007), 
hence of one type of governance arrangement. 
But which of the proposed external variables supposed to be important for the 
shape and the functioning of governance arrangements are relevant for suburban 
municipalities also? To answer this question the differences between suburban 
municipalities have to be exposed. Suburban municipalities are commonly defined over 
their functions in a metropolitan area, which mainly is being a sleeping village for 
commuters working in the core cities business districts (Oliver 2001; Kübler 2006; ARE 
2009). But the suburban reality is in itself of course a bit more complex: Suburban 
municipalities can also be industrially important places, they can be the home of big 
office companies, they can be characterised as agrarian places and their population size 
or the features of their built environment can vary quite a lot. Sometimes they are even 
characterised by all these aspects combined in a complex web of spatial, functional and 
social relations (Sieverts 1997). Further, suburbia is the longer the more a space of 
economic, social and political segregation, because of economic structural changes, the 
increased mobility of its inhabitants and in Switzerland also because of the local tax 
competition between municipalities (Oliver 2001; Kübler and Scheuss 2005; 
Schmidheiny 2006). In a nutshell, suburban municipalities can thus differ in their 
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population size, their economic and social composition and their land use patterns 
(Oliver 2001)9. 
I argue here that the municipalities’ economic situation and their size are the 
most important factors to influence local governance arrangements and influence the 
relations between public and private in the implementation processes, the used policy 
instruments and the formulated policy agenda in the policy field of spatial planning and 
economic development (see Table 1). These two factors and their possible impact are 
thus looked at more closely in the next chapters. Other mentioned factors are less 
important for the Swiss (spatial planning) context; especially the relationship to higher 
institutional levels and the question of decentralisation. Concerning spatial planning and 
development, Swiss municipalities have in general similar (and quite big) local 
autonomy and policy instruments to govern and regulate their spatial planning, their 
economic development policies and the thus built environment.  
 
Table 1: A first draft for my theoretical model to explain different governance arrangements and the key 
concepts to grab and describe them analytically 
External  Factor s  
 
Shape of  Loca l  
Governance 
arrangemen t  
= 
Type of relationship/collaboration 
between public and private actors 
Economic situation of 
a municipality 
Most important policy instruments used 
Size of a municipality Type of policy agenda 
2.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC PRESSURE 
According to Davies (2002) or DiGaetano and Strom (2003) the structural context is the 
most important source for different local settings in the area of urban governance. For 
them the structural context is equal to a changing economic situation and to a new 
understanding of statehood in modern capitalist societies facing globalisation processes, 
which means e.g. decentralisation of duties and power to lower state levels. As I argued 
before, I will only take the economic influences into account, because the differences in 
decentralisation and local autonomy are negligible between Swiss municipalities in the 
field of spatial planning and development. The spatially uneven development of the 
globalised economy produces however different situations for cities and their 
surrounding municipalities (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Brenner 1999, 2000; Brenner 
and Theodore 2004). In cities which are able to attract new-economy investments (as 
companies of the tertiary sector) the local governance arrangement look different than 
in cities with old-economy structures (as industry plants). DiGaetano and Strom (2003) 
argue that new forms of cooperative governance emerge in cities where investments in 
new economies are growing. Private firms and interests gain influence in local decision 
making processes since the position of public organisations as workers associations 
weakens. This leads to public private partnerships or more corporatist forms of urban 
governance.  
Until today these theoretical arguments have been formulated and tested for 
either the governance of metropolitan areas or for their core cities. I however argue that 
the uneven economic development has different – and sometimes even contradicting – 
implications, when we analyse suburban municipalities. At first we have to consider that 
                                                        
9 For Oliver (2001), suburban municipalities differ also because of their racial composition and their 
political institutions. The first is not relevant for municipalities in Switzerland and the second is discussed 
later in this paper in relation to the municipalities’ size. 
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suburban municipalities often do not have the same economic position in a metropolitan 
area than the core cities. Simply spoken, a suburban municipality is most often highly 
dependent on the economic situation of the metropolitan area (and its core city) that it 
belongs to. They thus find themselves in a favourable or a non-favourable economic 
surrounding, which is produced mainly not by themselves, but by the metropolitan area 
as a whole and the economic competitiveness of its core city. In economically successful 
metropolis’ suburban municipalities are under development pressure. They have to 
provide new housing and working spaces and are often the desired place to live for 
many people commuting to the core city (Brenner 2004). In economically negative 
surroundings they are however spaces of flight, what can result in a vicious circle 
followed by a shrinking population, less tax income and thus less investment 
attractiveness (Bernt 2009).  
There is another factor which differs between metropolitan areas or their core 
cities on the one hand and suburban municipalities on the other: The competition 
between these different levels of statehood, fostered by the globalising economy and the 
increasing mobility of capital (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; DiGaetano and Strom 2003; 
Brenner and Theodore 2004). Whereas metropolitan areas and core cities compete with 
other metropolitan areas and their core cities, suburban municipalities compete with 
their neighbouring communes in the same urban area and ergo with the same economic 
conditions10. Especially in countries with high local tax autonomies as Switzerland, such 
a competition can be assumed as highly developed (Schmidheiny 2006; Schaltegger et al. 
2011).  
For Kantor et al. (1997) and the authors of public choice the investment 
attractiveness of a municipality is an important factor in the bargaining position of the 
local state against private interests. I assume that the economic surrounding (positive or 
negative) and the Swiss tax system both shape this bargaining position and hence the 
local governance arrangement in suburban municipalities. Firstly it can be argued that 
the local tax competition makes it necessary for municipalities to be able to attract 
private capital. Private capital raises the local tax income used for the delivery of public 
services and thus makes it possible to decrease the tax level. Like this, municipalities 
gain again advantages over other communes in attracting more private capital. 
Municipalities under development pressure are hence in a better bargaining position to 
private interests than local governments in shrinking municipalities. To pursue 
collective goals with the help of private capital means in the field of spatial development 
that private investors are forced by the local government to follow at least some public 
goals (as e.g. planning public or green spaces, promote social housing) when developing 
new building projects. A positive economic situation means also that there exists a 
competition between private investors, what could be usefully capitalized by the local 
state in favour of its policy goals. The importance of public development policies that 
normally attract private investors however diminishes in economically shrinking 
regions (Bernt 2009). This fact leads to a poorer situation of the local state when 
confronted with private investors. Adapted to local spatial planning, this situation means 
that less private actors are ready to invest e.g. in housing or other building projects, 
because the demand for living or business space declines while the tax level often rises. 
The local government is thus the longer the more dependent on those private actors that 
still are able and willing to invest. Consequently it can be assumed that private interests 
gain importance in such situations, because the local state is not willing to scare the 
remaining investors away. 
                                                        
10 See here also the public choice literature on metropolitan governance: Tiebout (1956), Ostrom et al. 
(1961), Ostrom and Ostrom (1971), Norris (2001), Frey and Eichenberger (2001). 
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This theoretical argumentation leads to the following first thesis to be tested in 
Swiss suburban municipalities: 
Thesis 1: In situations characterised by an economic development pressure, the 
governance arrangement of a suburban municipality is dominated by the local 
government and not by private actors, whereas in shrinking municipalities the 
private actors dominate. 
2.3 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SIZE OF A MUNICIPALITY 
The question about the impact of the size of a political unit on political cooperation, on 
voter turnouts, on the efficiency of political processes or more general on political 
decision making processes has been a widely discussed one – with no clear answers yet 
(see e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973; Newton 1982; Oliver 2000; Rose 2002; Swaniewicz 2002). 
Current work on smaller and especially on suburban municipalities however discusses 
new and more detailed aspects of a municipality’s size in relation to its government or 
governance logics (Oliver 2001, 2012). 
What exactly differs between municipalities according to their size? Size alone is 
not a useful variable for explaining local governance arrangements; it has to be 
deconstructed in its core elements. I argue that two dimensions are important in this 
respect. Firstly municipalities differ in their political actions and their governing logic 
and hence in their governance arrangements since their size influences the form of local 
institutions, the scope of politically discussed topics and their political bias in which local 
resources are spent in a way profitable for the public (Oliver 2012). According to Oliver 
(2012) the political scope is narrower in smaller municipalities. This means that bigger 
municipalities tend to focus on more policy fields what results from the broader pool of 
interests formulated by their inhabitants and interest groups (see also Ladner 1994). 
Hence the smaller a suburban municipality, the more its politicians concentrate the 
public spending for the protection of local land prices, a low tax level and local school 
policies. These three topics are the most useful in attracting good tax payers (Oliver 
2012). Because smaller municipalities have narrower scopes and biases and thus 
smaller amounts of money have to be paid for public goals, a discussion over public 
spending is less important. This fact brings Oliver (2012) to the conclusion that 
longstanding cooperations in the form of Stone’s urban regimes are less likely to be 
found in small municipalities. Such regimes gain importance in bigger municipalities 
where conflicts over the priority of public goals emerge and the resources to pursue 
them are more fragmented. Longstanding cooperations offer the possibility of side-
payments and a certain chance of getting back the invested money – sometimes also 
indirectly – because of mutual trust or growing dependencies between public and 
private actors or interests (Stone 1993; Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Longstanding 
cooperations with similar interests and thus more coherent policy agendas can be more 
effective, but functioning regimes with different internal interest seem to have the 
higher stability during conflict situation. Or, as Stone (1993: 8) puts it: “Fixed 
preferences give rise to unstable coalitions and fluid preferences to stable one.” 
Secondly the professionalization of local political and administrative staff can 
influence local governance arrangements. Keating (1993: 389) states that “within cities 
the capacity of elected officials to manage change depends also on their bureaucratic and 
technical resources”. This conclusion is even more relevant when we consider that 
suburban municipalities are usually a lot smaller than most cities. Nevertheless they face 
complicated spatial and political situations as mentioned earlier. What does that mean 
for local governance arrangements? It is quite easy to observe that the 
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professionalization also depends on the size of a municipality. A local state of a big 
suburban municipality is according to Keating’s argument better enabled to build up 
technical knowledge and thus has the ability to meet private interests at eye level. 
Consequently bigger municipalities are able to build up longstanding coordinations with 
private actors more easily than small ones. Higher technical and personal resources 
within the municipal administration (as e.g. city planners, city architects or spatial 
planners) also help to guarantee a comprehensive local strategy and thus the feasibility 
of public and private goals. Such a strategy tends to be more elaborate and suitable for 
the specific spatial situation of a municipality and can hence also be the basis for a good 
cooperation with private investors, which often possess big technical resources 
themselves (Stone 2005). The same argumentation goes for the members of the local 
political executive. In smaller municipalities executives are more often institutionalised 
as laymen councils, whereas bigger municipalities tend to e.g. install full-time mayors. It 
can be assumed that these mayors are capable of influencing local governance 
arrangements in a cooperative way, because they are able to be present all the time and 
are thus a more reliable political contact person for private actors. 
In sum the following thesis can be derived from the argumentation about the 
municipalities’ size:  
Thesis 2: Local governance arrangements in the form of longstanding and close 
cooperations/coalitions between local government and private actors (urban 
regimes) can be found in big suburban municipalities and in municipalities with 
professionalised administrative and executive staff, whereas they do not exist in 
small municipalities. 
A good collaboration between public and private is however important in spatial 
planning and economic development: Without at least some help from either the public 
or the private side, most of the actually relevant economic development goals in 
suburban municipalities – be they private or public goals or economically positive or 
negative situations – can probably not be reached or implemented if one side pursues 
them unilateral. 
2.4 A MODEL FOR THE SHAPE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
If these two dimensions – the economic situation of a municipality and its size – and the 
theoretically derived theses are combined, the following model to explain the shape of 
local governance arrangements can be claimed. According to this I distinguish four 
different forms of local governance arrangements that differ on two dimensions: The 
degree of the domination of the local governance through either the local government or 
the most important private actors and interests, and the forms of collaboration between 
the local government and the private actors, be they longstanding coalitions or not. 
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Table 2: A model for the shape of local governance arrangements 
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dominated by the 
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governance with no 
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governance in 
longstanding coalitions 
shape of local 
governance 
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3 FOUR MUNICIPALITIES, 20 INTERVIEWS: A VERY SHORT 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
The case selection of the four municipalities under scrutiny here follows the logic of 
purposive sampling (Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2007). It is based on the two mentioned 
criteria that are relevant for the emergence and shape of different governance 
arrangements: Firstly I choose municipalities with different economic situations. It is 
quite easy to find suburban municipalities under development pressure in Switzerland. 
Almost all metropolitan or agglomeration areas have increased economically during the 
last two decades. To look at municipalities under specific economic pressure, our 
research project11 focuses on municipalities that have recently been connected to new 
transport infrastructure projects (as new or faster rapid train systems or new motorway 
connections). Such external events (we call them “urban ruptures”) are supposed to 
induce even more development pressure. To find shrinking municipalities in 
Switzerland is however less easy – but they exist. They can mostly be found at the edge 
of the five big metropolitan areas (with the core cities ZURICH, BASEL, GENEVA-LAUSANNE, 
BERN or LUGANO), or in agglomeration areas not connected with commuters to these 
mentioned areas. To select shrinking municipalities easier we focus additionally on 
places that have faced an immense economic decline, induced by the economic collapse 
                                                        
11 Project title: Urban ruptures/local interventions: Perspectives on suburban planning. Financed by the 
Swiss national science foundation (SNSF), settled at the Universities of Zurich and Fribourg (political 
science and urban geography) and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (sociology of 
architecture), more information on http://www.nfp65.ch/E/projects/Pages/default.aspx. In total ten 
municipalities are selected, whereby four of them are presented in this paper.  
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of locally important industry factories. Regions with shrinking pressure can be found in 
the eastern part of Switzerland close to the boarder to Germany and Austria; regions 
with development pressure in the metropolitan area of ZURICH. In these areas the 
municipalities have been selected according to their population size. For each economic 
situation a small and a big commune will thus be analysed. Table 3 gives an overview. 
Table 3: Selected municipalities and selection criteria 
Munic ipal ity  Economic s ituat ion  S ize ( inhabitants)  
USTER Development pressure Big (ca. 30’000) 
HEDINGEN Development pressure Small (ca 3’000) 
ARBON Shrinking pressure Big (ca 15’000) 
ST. MARGRETHEN Shrinking pressure Small (ca. 5’500) 
 
The data to analyse these four municipalities’ governance arrangements were collected 
with semi-structured interviews (Kvale 2007; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). I 
interviewed members of the local political executive (as mayors and political heads of 
the planning/building departments), members of the municipalities’ administrations (as 
administrative heads, spatial planners and city planners) and private actors (as 
investors or architects), in total 20 persons. The following empirical descriptions and 
analyses have been conducted with a qualitative thematic analysis based on the 
theoretically based propositions and theses mentioned before (Gibbs 2007). 
4 WHO GOVERNS AND HOW: DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS IN SWISS SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITIES 
In this chapter I will show empirical results from the four municipalities under scrutiny, 
starting with the two municipalities under development pressure, followed by the two 
others facing economic decline. All case studies are presented in the same way: Firstly I 
shortly outline the economic situations that shape the local governance arrangements as 
theoretically proposed. Secondly I describe the shape of the local governance 
arrangements with a focus on the most important public and private actors, the most 
important local policy goals and the policy instruments usually chosen to pursue the 
agenda. I will then look closer at my two derived theses, i.e. on the one hand at the 
relationships between the most important actors, contrasting the theoretical conditions 
for urban regimes with the empirical reality in the four municipalities. On the other 
hand I finally check for the local actors dominating the municipalities’ governance 
arrangement, be they urban regimes or other kinds of governance relations.  
4.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH: HEDINGEN AND USTER 
HEDINGEN and USTER are both municipalities of the suburban belt of Switzerland’s biggest 
city, ZURICH. They are thus part of the Swiss economic powerhouse, the metropolitan 
area of ZURICH. Additionally to this positive economic surrounding, the two 
municipalities are connected very well to the core city through fast train connections 
(around 15-20 minutes to ZURICH). Both municipalities have been connected even better 
to ZURICH during the last ten years because the train frequencies have been further 
increased. HEDINGEN has been additionally connected to the national motorway network 
a couple of years ago, nowadays allowing much faster rides to the central city. These 
excellent transport infrastructures have increased the development pressure relating to 
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new housing projects, new or better shopping possibilities and densification processes 
in the town centres, mostly for people not willing to live in the core city anymore, 
however commuting there every working day. 
 
I will start with the description of the smallest municipality in the sample, HEDINGEN. The 
most important actors concerning the municipal spatial planning and development 
policies are the local government12 (especially the mayor, who also holds the 
department of spatial planning) and the municipal administrative staff, namely its head 
and the person responsible for building licences13. Only a few private actors are 
mentioned to be important, mostly land owners who developed smaller and one bigger 
building projects during the last few years. Another important person is the head of a 
private spatial planning company, serving as the municipalities’ spatial planner. He 
advises the municipality in important questions as e.g. which policy instruments to use 
or which goals to pursue. 
The central ideas of the local policy agenda are the preservation of the 
municipality with a village like identity and the surrounding green space. This is sought 
with a non-growth policy relating to population – although the development pressure 
has been quite high during the last years, what can be observed by the high building 
activities in the neighbouring municipalities. The last changes of the local building 
regulations have consolidated these goals, however making little densification processes 
in the town centre possible. 
The most important policy instruments used are the local zoning plan14 (based on 
the cantonal and regional directive plans) that is the basis to issue regular building 
permits, and currently in one project a so called area development plan (an instrument 
that makes it possible to increase the intended floor area ratio when developing projects 
with a certain minimal area size).  
Taking the non-growth goals and the used policy instruments into account, it 
seems that a broadly established regime-like cooperation between public and private 
actors is not taking place right now. Only for the one bigger building project it was 
necessary to establish new cooperation patterns, which however not lasted for long. 
Agenda-setting is done by the political executive unilaterally, with some advice from the 
municipalities’ spatial planner. For the pursuit of the actual policy goals a further 
strategic and longstanding cooperation with private actors is not mentioned as 
necessary. There exist however informal connections between the public administration 
and private actors willing to invest, but the concern of these conversations are mostly 
small projects that can be handled within regular building regulations by the 
administration. 
                                                        
12 An ideal-typical structure of the political and administrative system of smaller Swiss municipalities can 
be found in the Annex 8.1. To draw a more accurate picture of the local governance arrangements I also 
distinguish between the local government (the political executive of a municipality) and the local 
administration (the bureaucratic branch of a municipality). This is however not in line with American 
scholars mainly using the term local government for the political system and the administrative branch 
together.  
13 In Switzerland, municipalities have big autonomy when it comes to the organisation of their political 
and administrative system. In most of the cantons (higher political tier as the Länder in Germany or the 
states in the US) municipalities are free to organise themselves concerning legislative and executive 
institutions (be they communal assemblies or parliaments and laymen councils or more professionally 
organised executives respectively). Some cantons however provide legal restrictions concerning e.g. the 
amount of seats of the executive branch, the work quota of the members of the executive or the type of 
legislative power (e.g. providing a parliament when having certain numbers of inhabitants).  
14 Find an overview concerning the most important policy instruments in the Swiss planning law in the 
Annex 8.2. 
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When focusing on the question whether public or private actors dominate the 
local governance arrangement, the following can be observed: As mentioned before, 
agenda-setting is done by the public authorities quite unilaterally. Opponent private 
interests, e.g. willing to establish new and bigger housing projects within the 
surrounding green space, are on the one hand held down argumentatively in public 
discussions as at the municipal assembly (municipal legislative). The argumentation 
contains always the central agenda issue, namely the preservation of the village-like 
identity of HEDINGEN. On the other hand the local government is eager to procrastinate 
the enquiry for one big building project (expensive housing in agrarian zones) at the 
higher state level (the canton). In so doing and at the same time hoping that the canton 
will stick to its actual policy of not agreeing on the establishment/rezoning of new 
building zones anyway, the local government succeeds in pursuing its agenda against 
private interests. For other, smaller projects, there exists a quite tight supervision of the 
process leading to building permits by the local administration. The building 
department is thus able to control the implementation of the policy-agenda in early 
stages of the building process together with the house and land owners concerning 
details as e.g. the prohibition of flat roofs in the town centre.  
 
Focussing on USTER, the second and biggest municipality under scrutiny, we observe the 
following important local actors: The representatives of the political executive (mostly 
the mayor and the municipal councils holding the building and the financial 
departments), highly ranked administrative staff members (as the head of the 
administration and the city planner), the presidents of the two important local 
commercial associations, the person accountable for fostering the local economy 
(employed by both the public authority and the commercial associations) and many 
private investors, architects and land owners. 
The political agenda is formulated in a comprehensive public city strategy, 
focusing on an increase in population and economic growth. To achieve these goals a 
further densification of the already quite urban city centre and the redevelopment of 
some urban brownfields is sought. The village-like old centres of the former 
neighbouring towns – nowadays amalgamated with USTER – should thereby stay rural. A 
high housing quality enriched with green space and public parks is pursued to attract 
good taxpayers willing to live in an urban area, but not in the metropolitan areas’ core 
city.  
The local actors in USTER chose the whole range of possible policy instruments. 
Additionally to the ones used in HEDINGEN, different and more directive plans and special 
zoning and urban design plans are employed. The local government recently started a 
new land use policy (buying strategically important real estate objects and developing 
them according to the policy agenda or selling them to private investors, making them to 
sign a contract to develop according to the local policy agenda). Policy instruments not 
intentionally designed for spatial planning and urban design are also used (as e.g. 
cantonal regulations for flood protection, which has been used to finance the 
modification of the centrally located park area). 
To pursue the proposed policy agenda, the local government and the 
administration officials need to cooperate quite a lot with private actors. This fact is 
firstly observable at the policy instruments chosen, which de jure make cooperation 
between public and private actors necessary. Special building regulations as special 
zoning and urban design plans come into effect (and result mostly in outcomes that all 
involved persons agree on) only after a discussion and decision process at which both 
parties participate. Secondly most of the planned projects are voluminous or affect more 
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than one parcel owned by different people with different development ideas. A 
cooperation bargained under a municipal umbrella is here often the only solution which 
makes a developing process possible at all. Moreover there is also cooperation that is 
not only project-oriented, but strategic and longstanding. The referred important actors 
communicate through formal, but also informal channels concerning the city’s policy 
agenda (one local association even formulated an own strategy for the development of 
the city centre, coming to similar results as the political executive), the biggest 
development projects and ideas for future developments. The mayor e.g. organises so 
called summit conferences with the presidents of the local commercial associations to 
discuss actual political questions. The political executive and sometimes also the city 
planner are also frequently present at different social get-togethers (e.g. commercial 
receptions, sightseeing of local business firms), where important projects are tangibly 
discussed and advanced. Finally public and private resources are merged for pivotal 
development projects: Private investors develop and finance new buildings for which 
political actors advocate in political decision making processes. The administration is at 
the same time responsible for the side projects linking new construction sites with 
existing public space nearby (e.g. valorisation of road space). The governance 
arrangement of USTER thus can be defined clearly as an urban regime. 
Of course it is not easy to assess the domination by different actors in a 
governance arrangement resembling an urban regime, because the emphasis on 
cooperation is a core aspect of it. In USTER it is however still possible to see that the local 
government is in general able to get through with its ideas. Within the most important 
building projects of the last few years the remarkable role of the city planner has to be 
mentioned. His immense knowledge of the natural, functional and architectonic 
structures of USTER (he has been on this position for almost 30 years) makes it possible 
for the municipal authorities to intervene in private projects with thoroughly formulated 
critic and assertiveness. Moreover he and his department have steered projects in 
favourable directions for the city, sometimes with the use of the already mentioned 
unconventional policy instruments as well. The city’s strategy has been born ten years 
ago, also based on the city planners’ knowledge. The municipal building department 
interferes also in smaller building projects. When a planned project violates the cities’ 
strategy or does not suit to its surrounding they decline the building permit, based on 
the so called classification paragraph of the planning regulation. The only possible 
solution for the land owner is to prosecute a claim by legal action, which is not at all 
favourable for all parties. Usually, but not always, this harsh approach by the 
municipality leads to a new discussion and reassessment of the whole project. 
4.2 ECONOMIC DECLINE: ST. MARGRETHEN AND ARBON 
The eastern part of Switzerland has economically long lived from major industrial 
companies. Structural changes (outsourcing of production, sales slumps, etc.) have led to 
significant economic problems and to the abandoning of many such companies. In ST. 
MARGRETHEN (wood-processing, paint production and textile industry) and ARBON 
(mainly lorry and coach production), locally important companies had to give up their 
production about 20 years ago. What has followed was a vicious circle of rising tax level, 
emigration of good taxpayers and immigration of people seeking cheap flats, in short: a 
huge economic decline, resulting also in big urban brownfields still seen as “scars in the 
midst of the town centres”. Moreover the eastern part of Switzerland has long not been 
part of a big and powerful metropolitan area, and is today still only partially. These facts 
have led to shrinking pressure, bringing difficult situations for the local actors as 
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whether and how to develop and finance new development projects or how to set up 
and communicate an adequate policy agenda. 
 
Starting with the smaller municipality of ST. MARGRETHEN I observe the following actors 
as the most important in the local policy field of spatial planning and development: The 
political executive and here mainly the full-time mayor15 (responsible for the 
municipalities’ strategic spatial development), the head and the secretary of the 
municipalities’ building department, the private company being in charge of the 
municipal spatial planning and a few important investors (mainly investing in the big 
development project on the biggest urban brownfield). 
The policy agenda focuses mainly on the redevelopment of the big urban 
brownfield next to the railway station and on other small former industrial areas with 
premium housing project and new spaces for business and retail companies. One of the 
main goals is the attraction of good taxpayers to influence the economic disadvantages 
of the high local tax level positively. Further the municipality aims for the densification 
of its town centre, tied to the valorisation of public streets and better shopping facilities. 
For pursuing these goals different policy instruments are chosen by the 
municipalities’ authorities and the private investors. The basis is the communal zoning 
plan and the spatial planning regulations. For bigger (and the one huge) project special 
development plans are used. The political executive further makes often use of land use 
policies, i.e. buying strategically important real estate objects to develop them 
unilaterally or to use them for bargaining processes with private actors willing to invest 
neighbouring estates. The local government finally threatened to use an instrument 
called planning zone to stop the current planning process for five years, using the time 
for a re-evaluation of all development possibilities for a specific area. 
Looking closer at the policy agenda and the choice of instruments, it seems clear 
that some deeper cooperation between public and private actors have had to be 
established. Concerning the biggest project, the redevelopment of the huge urban 
brownfield, there exist a close cooperation (i.e. regular meetings on all major topics e.g. 
concerning future usage of the buildings, the building permit, the design of the further 
process etc.) between the investor and the municipality, represented mainly by the 
mayor and the head of the building department. This cooperation between different 
private actors and the local government is however not reaching beyond this single 
project. One reason could be that the main investor is not a local and thus not that much 
tied to local day to day political processes. The political agenda is designed and 
formulated by the executive government in cooperation with the private spatial planner 
in charge (who is not a local), and is not based on the ideas or a close cooperation with 
the most important private investors. Public interests expressed by citizens at public 
events or over other informal communication channels are included step by step into 
the agenda goals though. These concerns however are not always connected to specific 
questions of spatial development – there exists no overarching policy agenda supported 
by the political actors and the financially important private investors. To sum up, it is 
not possible to find an urban regime with a longstanding cooperation concerning the 
whole policy field, its agenda and forms of cooperation. Cooperation and the sharing of 
resources is rather project based, and not strategic. 
Coming to the question whether private actors dominate the local governance 
arrangement of ST. MARGRETHEN I observe the following: Although the municipality is 
                                                        
15 In the two cantons to which the here described municipalities under development pressure belong, St. 
Gallen and Thurgau, mayors are often appointed full-time (in contrary to the canton of Zurich, where the 
before mentioned municipalities belong to), although there exist no binding cantonal legal principle. 
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highly dependent on one investor, financing the redevelopment of the big urban 
brownfield, the local government is eager to bring its own ideas in. They do it for 
example in the project meetings with the private actors. Compared to these rather soft 
instruments preferred by the omnipresent mayor the threat of installing a planning zone 
to stop further planning a few years ago has been quite contrasting. The reason for using 
this instrument was that the former investors did not agree on the municipalities’ idea of 
developing the urban brownfield. It eventually led to a re-evaluation of the planning 
possibilities and to the actually pursued project. Public actors also take part in 
architectural competitions as members of the jury, especially in those projects where the 
public is land owner as well. Here the potential of strategic buying of real estate objects 
is observable. For smaller building projects as single family homes there exist 
“consultation-hours” by the building department, which are frequently used by the land 
owners and make compromises possible, but is not eliminating the threat of private land 
owners developing projects not favoured by the municipality within the normal building 
regulations. The local governance arrangement is however in general not dominated by 
private actors. 
 
What about the last municipality in the presented sample, ARBON? Here the most 
important actors in the communal spatial planning and development processes are the 
two relevant members of the political executive (the mayor and the municipal council 
for the building department), the possessor of the administrative position for city 
development and communication and further administrative staff members (the head of 
the building department and the municipalities spatial planner). Some private actors are 
also mentioned as being important. Here the one project developer company 
responsible for the huge and centrally located urban brownfield is crucial. Further a 
broad network of entrepreneurs, architects and local investors as well as local 
politicians (many of them being part of the local liberal’s party) is mentioned. 
The local political agenda concentrates on a modification of the whole city, away 
from the industrially based working city to an entrepreneurial business city. Thereby 
the old town is sought to increasingly be a place for living, what is also the goal for the 
former industrial parts – especially the centrally located huge urban brownfield – of the 
city. An additional increase of employment numbers is another important policy aim. 
One of the major projects of the last years has been a new cantonal access road bringing 
traffic quicker to the city centre and the new development sites and away from smaller 
side streets and the old town.  
The choice of policy instruments to pursue the policy agenda is quite similar to 
the one in USTER, i.e. many different instruments are used: the local zoning plan, various 
directive and special usage plans. ARBONS local government does not use instruments not 
designed for spatial planning and except in one case it normally also does not buy real 
estate objects. The local communication strategy with which the inhabitants are 
informed is however more prominent and more comprehensive than in the other 
municipalities under scrutiny, what relates also to the special administrative position for 
city development and communication, newly established by the former mayor about 
seven years ago.  
In following the ambitious policy goals the local government and the 
administration are dependent on private financial potential. The private however need 
the political support to get through the political (i.e. the parliament) and administrative 
process with their projects. There is thus a broad cooperation between public and 
private actors observable, which takes part on different levels of formality, but also in 
quite different qualitative manners. The aim of the public authorities is to assure the 
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public goals, i.e. valorisation of public space, in privately financed project, while creating 
a positive climate for investments of other private companies. Many of these 
cooperations are established only on a project basis. However there are also strategic 
meetings, informal or formal, between important actors. As in USTER, ARBONS mayor has 
established summit conferences, at which different topics concerning the municipality’s 
future can be discussed informally and without any written protocol. These meetings are 
used widely by local entrepreneurs, architects and also by administrative staff members. 
The municipality’s advertisement slogan “city of broad horizons” has been formulated 
by the political executive, but is widely accepted and supported by various private 
actors, who also see their interests represented by it. The former mayor (in office from 
2006 to 2012) has been very important for the establishment of such good cooperation 
schemes. His many contacts to local entrepreneurs, but also to cantonal and local 
politicians have paved the way to many (also informally settled) deals concerning the 
spatial development of the city. The governance arrangement of ARBON thus resembles 
an urban regime. 
Coming to the dominating actors, a more complicated picture has to be drawn. 
Concerning the local policy agenda the local government clearly dominates the local 
governance. In concrete building projects this is however not always that easy. 
Especially in the development project of the centrally located urban brownfield, a 
certain dependency of the public actors is observable. Here private actors thus possess 
quite high leeway to get their development ideas through. During the office period of the 
former mayor, he and the person responsible for city development and communication 
could balance these processes to their favour. But because the special usage plan was 
implemented earlier, their range of influence was quite small. Since the demission of the 
former mayor and his staff member the pendulum swung back with not yet predictable 
results for the originally planned public spaces. In smaller project the local government 
could intervene successfully, also against persons belonging to the local building elite. 
One pivotal project was declined because of “architectural deficits”. It is thus possible to 
observe a certain domination by private actors, especially in the one crucial project. 
When it comes to the local policy agenda and smaller development projects, the local 
government is able to play an important role though. 
5 WHY DO GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS DIFFER? 
5.1 A SHORT ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS VS. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
As displayed in Table 4 the theoretically proposed model can only be empirically shown 
partially. In short, four quite different local governance arrangements can be observed. 
The local governance arrangements in the two municipalities under development 
pressure resemble the theoretically proposed shapes: they are in both municipalities 
dominated by the local government and are either urban regime like (in the big USTER) 
or not based on longstanding strategic cooperation between private and public actors 
(in the small HEDINGEN).  
For the municipalities facing economic decline the picture is however not that 
clear: Even though there are either no longstanding coalition pattern observable in the 
smaller ST. MARGRETHEN, compared to urban regime like structures in the bigger ARBON, 
the domination by private actors is not visible as theoretically proposed. In ST. 
MARGRETHEN there is a dominating local government, where in ARBON it can only 
dominate the smaller building projects according to its agenda aims. Concerning the one 
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important redevelopment of a former industrial area, there is a private company, against 
that’s interests only the former mayor and his specialist for development and 
communication could intervene successfully according to their goals.  
Table 4: Presentation of the proposed model for the shape of local governance arrangements contrasted 
with empirical results in four municipalities. 
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Let us then look closer at the relations between economic situations, the size of 
municipalities and local governance arrangements, taking different reasons and 
statements by the interviewees  into account. 
 
5.2 EXTERNAL PRESSURE AND SIZE MATTERS, BUT SOMEHOW DIFFERENTLY 
AND MORE INTERLINKED THAN THEORETICALLY PROPOSED 
The economic situation of a municipality should – as I proposed theoretically in thesis 1 
– influence the local governance arrangement of a suburban municipality. Why and how 
thus can an economically positive or negative situation foster the domination of the local 
governance arrangement by actors of the local government or by private stakeholders 
empirically?  
The two case studies show firstly that the definition of a coherent local policy 
agenda is easier when facing economic growth. The case studies show that the tax 
competition between the municipalities’ makes it necessary to define goals that pursue 
the attraction of good tax payers, what of course is also true for municipalities facing 
economic decline. It is however easier for economically developing municipalities in the 
metropolitan area of ZURICH to fill special niches, because there are many good taxpayers 
with quite divers ideas of an ideal place to live outside the core city. USTER and HEDINGEN 
– though their agendas are different, a city for urban commuters vs. a village-like town 
surrounded by green space – are able to set up goals that attract many people, what 
gives the local government a legitimization for their strategies and their domination of 
the political processes leading to new building projects. ST. MARGRETHEN and ARBON are 
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seeking for better taxpayers in general, but do not have the freedom to concentrate on 
one special segment of future inhabitants. Shortly, the high demand for various different 
living ideals in economically developing regions makes the interventions of local 
governments easier. One has to consider however, that the two municipalities facing 
economic growth can define more precise agenda goals also because they vary so much 
in their size (USTER is the third biggest municipality in the metropolitan area of ZURICH, 
HEDINGEN one of the smallest), what would reflect a bias according to the case selection 
strategy. Municipalities with inhabitant numbers between USTER and HEDINGEN are in 
more difficult situations, because the niches of being big or small is lacking (see 
Devecchi forthcoming). A clear policy agenda makes it also possible to choose and 
implement adequate policy instruments for further spatial development processes 
because ideas concerning these processes already exist. Examples are the choice of a 
local directive plan to smoothly develop a new housing area analogical to the city 
strategy in USTER or the already mentioned refused intervention for a new housing zone 
of HEDINGENS municipal council at the cantonal level. Last but not least the awareness of 
not having development ideas helps also, as e.g. HEDINGEN decided not to implement a 
planning zone, because it lacked precise ideas how to use it.  
Secondly an economically positive surrounding is making the local governments 
less dependent on single but important building projects and the private investors being 
in charge of them. ST. MARGRETHEN and ARBON have made the redevelopment of their 
centrally located urban brownfields to their primary agenda goals. Here especially the 
local government of the latter struggles in achieving the targeted goals, because the only 
company investing is not keen to pursue all of them (e.g. housing units with large public 
spaces vs. expensive housing units with semi-private spaces). In USTER however there 
are not only more projects, but also more investors. The possibility to develop several 
bigger projects simultaneously has on the one hand lowered the pressure on the local 
government and the administration to influence each single project as much as possible 
according to their strategy goals; i.e. different goals have been pursued with different 
projects. This situation then fostered on the other hand a surrounding of positive 
feedback within the circle of private investors about the not too tight position of the 
local government, what led to mutual trust between the private and the public actors – a 
necessary condition to establish an urban regime. 
Thirdly the two cases in the eastern part of Switzerland show however that 
economic decline not always has to lead to a domination of the local governance 
arrangement by private actors. The responses to this situation of the actual mayor in ST. 
MARGRETHEN and the former mayor in ARBON let assume contradicting behaviours in 
relation to the theoretically proposed model. Instead of being under pressure by private 
interests they built up their administrations (with a new position for development and 
communication in ARBON), took over the steering wheels concerning the most important 
projects, became the nodal points of the local governance networks and rewrote the 
existing policy goals in coherent communication messages and in revised local directive 
plans (in both municipalities). Such behaviour is possible because of two reasons: On the 
one hand the strong position of the mayors reflects their full-time employment. On the 
other hand personal skills play an important role: Both mayors are described as “doers”, 
as extraordinary well connected to local politicians, to private investors and to cantonal 
personnel. Further both of them have a broad technical knowledge and interpret their 
role as mayors somehow similar: as the first contact person of the local government 
concerning all possible problems posed by inhabitants and other private stakeholders. 
Such a strong interpretation of the role as a mayor is not observable in USTER and 
HEDINGEN, but perhaps also not necessary because of the better economic situation and 
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the thus easier way to pursue the policy goals. One has to consider however that the 
institutional possibility of a strong mayor not always has to lead to such strong 
interpretations of the mayors’ function in reality. The bargaining advantage of the local 
government in ARBON came for example to a halt after the demission of the mentioned 
mayor. Today the pursuit of the former public goals is more uncertain than ever before. 
The size of a municipality matters as theoretically proposed in thesis 2 according 
to the short summary of the four case studies. Local governance arrangements 
resembling urban regimes can be found in the two bigger municipalities. Looser, less 
longstanding forms of cooperation in the smaller. Looking closer at the results and 
comparing these foundings, the following points seem to be remarkable. 
As already mentioned before, it seems that the professionalization of the political 
executive firstly influences the cooperation schemes of the municipalities under scrutiny 
quite a lot. Full-time mayors are not only able to take over responsibility in times of 
economic crisis or for particular important projects; they can also influence the broader 
way of cooperation established in their municipalities. The mayors of USTER and ARBON 
are not only present in the most important building projects, but organise arenas for 
discussions on broad topics and various projects concerning their municipalities’ future. 
They include private stakeholders, administrative heads of departments and their 
colleagues of the municipal councils intentionally to build up strategic alliances and 
networks, which then advocate for their goals. After a positive political decision these 
persons are also held accountable when it comes to the implementation, i.e. the 
development and financing of new building projects, small side-projects and further 
ideas for development.  
Although there is a full-time mayor in ST. MARGRETHEN as well, he is not able to 
establish regime-like forms of cooperation. This fact can be connected to the second 
point to be discussed here: the professionalization of the local administration. The 
mayor of ST. MARGRETHEN seems to be too absorbed by the one big redevelopment 
project, and is thus not able to establish a coalition for an even broader range of policy 
agenda goals. USTER and ARBON however do not only possess full-time mayors, but also 
more administrative positions not only concerned with operational question. USTER’S 
city planner and ARBON’S specialist on development and communication are used as 
strategic assets by their mayors: They can provide a backup of technical, strategic and 
architectural knowledge – not only focused on one single project – that can usefully be 
brought into discussions by the municipalities’ council or the mayor when bargaining 
various projects with private investors. Whereby the continuity of the public strategy 
could have been ensured in USTER with the city planner, there is not that much hope for 
continuity in ARBON. This is because of the demission not only of the former mayor, but 
also of the person responsible for development and communication. Establishing a 
regime-like cooperation network is thus only one side of the coin – it must sustain 
political and administrative changes, what seems to be harder than imagined. 
Finally I shortly want to focus on the choice of policy instruments, which mostly 
do not relate to the economic surrounding but to the size of a municipality. The 
stakeholders of the two smaller municipalities and here especially the ones in HEDINGEN 
choose instruments that are connected to less administrative resources than bigger 
municipalities. Further they choose a smaller set of instruments. They thereby generate 
a more formal cooperation with private actors; the regular process to a building permit 
is adequate for their mostly smaller building projects (except the big redevelopment 
project in ST. MARGRETHEN). In USTER and ARBON the choice of instruments results in a 
broader variety of instruments, which further result in the need for bargaining about the 
goals of the projects between public and private actors (e.g. architectural competitions, 
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PPP’s or instruments based on special building regulations as special development plans). 
The need for a differing choice of policy instruments can be found also in the more 
complex development of bigger municipalities, where bigger and higher buildings are 
sought to develop or where the existing ideas for development are discussed more 
widely.  
In sum, both proposed explaining factors seem to influence the local governance 
arrangements. Their explanatory power is thus much higher when they are not taken 
into account as independent factors. The economic situation is sometimes responsible 
for certain conditions also shaped by the size of the municipality and vice versa. As we 
have seen, the question whether public or private actors dominate a regime-like 
governance arrangement is for example difficult to answer, because regimes are always 
a type of cooperation based on mutual trust and resources, whereby too much 
domination of one side could jeopardise such a cooperation. 
Besides these two factors influencing the shape of local governance 
arrangements, other possible explanatory factors should be taken into account after 
considering these case studies. First and foremost the importance of the interpretation 
of the different roles by different actors must be taken into account. We have seen that 
similar positions are not always filled with people acting similar. These different 
interpretation of positions can have crucial influence on local governance arrangements, 
be it their policy agendas or their choice of policy instruments. 
6 CONCLUSION: THE VEIL IS CLEARING, BUT NOT TOTALLY 
The aim of this paper was to investigate two related research questions concerning local 
governance arrangements and thus tying it to Dahl’s question of ‘who governs?’. Firstly I 
wanted to know whether different kinds of governance arrangements exist in suburban 
municipalities and which factors can be made responsible for the establishment of these 
types. Secondly I asked how public and private stakeholders can influence the decision-
making and implementation processes of local development policies within these 
arrangements. To answer these two questions, two different arguments from the body of 
the urban governance literature have been taken into account, which until yet focused 
mostly on big cities or metropolitan areas as a whole. These two arguments have been 
combined to a model of local governance arrangements. Firstly I proposed the thesis 
that the economic situation of a municipality shapes the domination in a local 
governance arrangement, either by public or private stakeholders. Secondly I derived 
the thesis that the size of a municipality, i.e. the professionalization of the municipal 
administration and executive shape the local governance arrangement in relation to the 
form of cooperation between the public and the private actors. My results base on a 
qualitative analysis of four suburban municipalities in Switzerland.  
To sum up I found four quite different local governance arrangements, which are 
in accordance with some of the theoretical propositions: Local governance 
arrangements in bigger municipalities tend to resemble the form of urban regimes; i.e. 
longstanding coalitions between public and private actors which set up a commonly 
formulated policy-agenda and establish a common use of normally disperse resources 
(as private financial capital and institutional decision making power). In small 
municipalities there can be observed looser forms of cooperation between public and 
private stakeholders, in which no common agenda is established. The picture of the 
impact of different economic surrounding on the local governance arrangement is 
however less clear. In developing regions a domination of the political processes by the 
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political actors is observable, in line with the theoretically proposed argumentation. In 
shrinking municipalities however there is no full domination by private actors. Although 
public officials can get through with their ideas in smaller projects often, there is 
however a certain dependency on them in the big pivotal projects, concerning the 
redevelopment of the centrally located urban brownfields. Here private stakeholders are 
able to gain advantages to implement their own agendas (e.g. expensive housing units 
vs. public spaces).  
Although the proposed theoretical arguments have made it possible to look 
behind local governance arrangements in suburban municipalities quite 
comprehensively, they do not unveil all relevant processes concerning the question of 
who governs and how. One reason is that the two mentioned factors (size of a 
municipality and its economic surrounding) theoretically influencing the shape of local 
governance arrangement and also their proposed impacts are not always easy 
distinguishable. 
The case studies however also reveal one other promising factor to study further: 
the perception of the roles of the involved (public) actors and the real consequences 
resulting from these interpretations. Here especially the strongly acting mayors in the 
two shrinking municipalities compared to the mayors facing economic development give 
examples of different (personal) understandings of the local state: the former see the 
state and its role not only as an intervening state as the latter do, but also as an acting 
state (e.g. by actively and strategically buying land and developing it according to their 
own ideas) (see also Braun and Giraud 2009). Actors in different municipalities thus do 
not only have similar or different institutional or financial power, they also show similar 
or different behaviour when it comes to their agency.  
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8  ANNEX 
8.1 IDEAL-TYPICAL STRUCTURE OF A SUBURBAN SWISS MUNICIPALITY 
Table 5: The political structure of an ideal-typical Swiss suburban municipality, notice that the legislative 
institutions can vary, as well as the functions of the different departments. 
 Public Public elections 
Political 
structure 
  
Legislative 
institutions 
Either municipal assembly… 
 
… or municipal parliament 
  
 Municipal council 
Executive 
institutions 
Mayor 
Municipal 
council 1 
Municipal 
council 2 
Municipal 
council 3 
Municipal 
council 4 
       
Administrative 
structure 
Administrative 
departments 
Head of 
admini-
stration 
Department 
head 1 
Department 
head 2 
Department 
head 3 
Department 
head 4 
e.g. 
presidential 
department, 
town 
development 
e.g. building 
department 
e.g. school 
department 
e.g. 
financial 
department 
e.g. 
department 
for culture 
and sport 
 
8.2 SWISS (MUNICIPAL) SPATIAL PLANNING INSTRUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW 
Table 6: The "toolkit" of Swiss municipalities concerning spatial development (based on Muggli 2011: , 
adapted by L.D.) 
Class ic  Spatia l  P lann ing  Contro l  o f  land  
use ,  land use  
pol icy  
Incent ive system s  
strategic 
background 
strategic, 
binding for 
administration 
operative, binding for 
land owners 
buying land 
(strategically) by 
public authorities, 
selling it with 
purpose to private or 
developing own 
projects 
contractions, 
PPP 
boni 
systems 
strategies, 
concepts 
directive plan zoning 
plan 
building 
regulation 
   
standard/special 
building regulations 
(see next table) 
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Table 7: Standard vs. special building regulations and their instruments 
 Condit ions to  use  Process  to  bu i ld ing per mit  Po licy  Instruments  
Standard 
bui ld ing  
regu lat ions  
projects based strictly 
on zoning plan  
normal process to building 
permit (via municipal 
administration) 
Zoning plan, municipal 
building regulations, area 
development plan 
Spec ial  
bui ld ing  
regu lat ions  
projects higher, 
bigger, … than zoning 
plan allows for 
special process to building 
permit (mostly also via political 
executive and/or , sometimes 
even via political legislative) 
special development plan 
 
